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Abstract
The main contribution of the paper is to provide a weaker non-
satiation assumption than the one commonly used in the literature
to ensure the existence of competitive equilibrium. Our assumption
allows for satiation points inside the set of individually feasible con-
sumptions, provided that the consumer has satiation points available
to him outside this set. As a result, we show the concept of equilibrium
with dividends (See Aumann and Dreze (1986), Mas-Collel (1992)) is
pertinent only when the set of satiation points is included in the set of
individually feasible consumptions. Our economic motivation stems
from the fact that in decentralized markets, increasing the incomes of
consumers through dividends, if it is possible, is costly since it involves
the intervention of a social planner. Then, we show, in particular, how
in securities markets our weak nonsatiation assumption is satisfied by
Werner’s (1987) assumption.
JEL classification codes: D51, C71.
Keywords: Satiation, Dividends, Equilibrium, Exchange Economy, Short-
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contributions of Arrow-Debreu (1954), and Mckenzie (1959),
on the existence of a competitive equilibrium, a subject of ongoing interest
in the economics profession has been the robustness of the various assump-
tions made to ensure such a result. On the consumer side, assumptions such
as the convexity of preferences, free-disposal and survival have been inves-
tigated both conceptually and empirically by numerous economists ranging
from development economists to decision theorists. The seemingly innocuous
assumption of nonsatiation, normally represented in Microeconomics text-
books by the monotonicity of preferences, appears to have received much
less attention. Perhaps, the main critique to the insatiability assumption is
that the human nature calls it into question. Namely, any moderately greedy
person will testify to their occasional satiation. Technically, a satiation point
seems to be genuinely guaranteed with continuous preferences, whenever the
choice set is bounded. Having a bounded choice set is hardly surprising, as
consumption activities take place over a limited time span. Accordingly, this
condition has been weakened by assuming that nonsatiation holds only over
individually feasible consumptions 1; that is to say, satiation levels are higher
than the actual consumption levels involved in trade.
In the presence of satiation points in individually feasible consumption
sets, we find in the literature the concept of equilibrium with coupons or
dividends that extend the classical general equilibrium theory to the class
of such economies (see Aumann and Dreze (1986), Mas-Collel (1992), Kaji
(1996), Cornet, Topuzu and Yildiz (2003)) 2. The underlying idea is to al-
low the nonsatiated consumers to benefit, through dividends, from the bud-
get surplus created by non budget-binding optimal consumptions of satiated
consumers. The analysis of the above-named authors has proved to be rel-
evant to the study of markets with price rigidities, such as Labor market.
One issue with equilibrium with dividends is that, increasing the incomes of
consumers in decentralized markets, if it is possible, is costly since it involves
the intervention of a social planner.
In this paper, our main contribution is to introduce a weak nonsatiation
1Individually feasible consumptions are defined as the projection, on individual’s choice
set, of consumptions that could potentially be achieved by trade
2See also Dreze and Muller (1980), Florig and Yildiz (2002), Le Van and Minh (2004),
Konovalov (2005).
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assumption that ensures the existence of an exact competitive equilibrium
(without dividends). Our assumption allows for the satiation points in in-
dividually feasible consumption set, provided that the satiation area is not
a subset of the individually feasible consumptions. Stated formally, if we
consider Mi to be the maximum of the utility function of consumer i over
individually feasible consumption set, our assumption stipulates that there
be a consumption bundle outside the individually feasible consumption set
that guarantees at least the utility level Mi. The standard nonsatiation as-
sumption rather requires that there be a consumption bundle outside the
individually feasible consumption set that guarantees strictly more than the
utility level Mi.
In a recent paper, Won and Yannelis (2005) demonstrate the existence of
a competitive equilibrium with a different nonsatiation assumption, in a more
general setting. Their assumption allows the satiation area to be inside the
individually feasible consumption sets, provided that it is unaffordable with
respect to any price system supporting the preferences of the nonsatiated
consumers. Won and Yannelis (2005) also show that their assumption is
implied by our weak nonsatiation assumption and could be suitably applied
to some asset pricing models. Notwithstanding the novelty of their approach,
their assumption relies on price systems, whereas our weak nonsatiation is
defined on the primitives of the economy.
In securities markets with short-selling, Werner (1987) introduces a non-
satiation assumption which allows the existence of satiation points even if
they are in the projections of the feasible set. Werner’s assumption stipu-
lates that each trader has a useful portfolio. This is defined as a portfolio
which, when added, at any rate, to any given portfolio increases the trader’s
utility. In particular his assumption implies an unbounded set of satiation
points. In the paper, we show that Werner’s nonsatiation implies our weak
nonsatiation assumption. We also provide an example where Werner’s nonsa-
tiation does not hold, whereas our weak nonsatiation assumption is satisfied,
and consequently an equilibrium exists.
The paper is organized as follows, Section 2 is devoted to the model. In
Section 3, we shall introduce our new nonsatiation assumption. In Section
4, we compare our new nonsatiation assumption with Werner’s nonsatiation.
Section 5 is an Appendix.
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2 The Model
We consider an economy with a finite number l of goods and a finite number
I of consumers. For each i ∈ I, let Xi ⊂ Rl denote the set of consumption
goods, let ui : Xi −→ R denote the utility function and let ei ∈ Xi be the
initial endowment. In the sequel, we will denote this economy by
E = {(Xi, ui, ei)i∈I} .
An individually rational feasible allocation is the list (xi)i∈I ∈
∏
i∈I Xi,
which satisfies
∑
i∈I xi =
∑
i∈I ei, and ui(xi) ≥ ui(ei), ∀i ∈ I. We denote by
A the set of individually rational feasible allocations. We shall denote by Ai
the projection of A onto Xi.
The set of individually rational utilities is given by
U = {(vi) ∈ R|I|+ | there exists x ∈ A s.t. ui(ei) ≤ vi ≤ ui(xi), ∀i ∈ I}.
In the following, for simplicity, U will be called utility set.
We consider the following definition of Walras equilibrium (resp. quasi-
equilibrium).
Definition 1. A Walras equilibrium (resp. quasi-equilibrium) of E is a list
((x∗i )i∈I , p
∗) ∈∏i∈I Xi × (Rl \ {0}) which satisfies:
(a)
∑
i∈I x
∗
i =
∑
i∈I ei (Market clearing);
(b) for each i one has p∗ · x∗i = p∗ · ei (Budget constraint), and for each
xi ∈ Xi, with ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ), it holds p∗ · xi > p∗ · ei. [resp. p∗ · xi ≥ p∗ · ei].
In the presence of satiation points in individually feasible consumption
sets, we find in the literature the concept of equilibrium with dividends (see
Aumann and Dreze (1986), Mas-Collel (1992), Cornet, Topuzu and Yildiz
(2003)). The dividends increase the income of nonsatiated consumers, in
order to capture the surplus created by satiated consumers. In the following,
we define the concept of equilibrium (resp. quasi-equilibrium) with dividends.
Definition 2. An equilibrium (resp. quasi-equilibrium) with dividends (d∗i )i∈I ∈
R
|I|
+ of E is a list ((x∗i )i∈I , p∗) ∈
∏
i∈I Xi ×Rl which satisfies:
(a)
∑
i∈I x
∗
i =
∑
i∈I ei (Market clearing);
(b) for each i ∈ I one has p∗ · x∗i ≤ p∗ · ei + d∗i (Budget constraint), and
for each xi ∈ Xi, with ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ), it holds p∗ · xi > p∗ · ei + d∗i . [resp.
p∗ · xi ≥ p∗ · ei + d∗i ].
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When d∗i = 0, for all i ∈ I, an equilibrium (resp. quasi-equilibrium) with
dividends is a Walras equilibrium (resp. quasi-equilibrium).
Remark The passage from a quasi-equilibrium with dividends to an equi-
librium with dividends is similar to the one in the standard Walrasian case.
That is to say, let ((x∗i )i∈I , p
∗) be a quasi-equilibrium with dividends (d∗i )i∈I .
Assume that for all i ∈ I, the set {xi ∈ Xi | ui(xi) > ui(x∗i )} is relatively
open in Xi, and inf p
∗ ·Xi < p∗ · x∗i , then, ((x∗i )i∈I , p∗) is an equilibrium with
dividends (d∗i )i∈I .
Now, we list our assumptions:
(H1) For each i ∈ I, the set Xi is closed and convex.
(H2) For each i ∈ I, the utility function ui is strictly quasi-concave and upper
semicontinuous3.
(H3) The utility set U is compact.
(H4) For each i ∈ I, for all xi ∈ Ai, there exists x′i ∈ Xi such that ui(x′i) >
ui(xi).
For every i ∈ I, let Si = {x∗i ∈ Xi : ui(x∗i ) = maxxi∈Xi ui(xi)}. The set
Si is the set of satiation points for agent i. Observe that under assumptions
(H1)− (H2), the set Si is closed and convex.
3 The Results
3.1 Equilibrium with dividends
We first give an existence of Walras quasi-equilibrium theorem when there
exists no satiation.
Theorem 1. Assume (H1)−(H4), then there exists a Walras quasi-equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is quite standard. See e.g. Arrow and Debreu (1954) when
the consumption sets are bounded from below, or the proof given in Dana,
Le Van and Magnien (1999) for an exchange economy.¤
3We recall that a function ui is said to be quasi-concave if its level-set Lα = {xi ∈ Xi :
ui(xi) ≥ α} is convex, for each α ∈ R.
The function ui is strictly quasi-concave if and only if, for all xi, x′i ∈ Xi, ui(x′i) > ui(xi)
and λ ∈ [0, 1), then ui(λxi + (1 − λ)x′i) > ui(xi). It means that ui(λxi + (1 − λ)x′i) >
min(ui(xi), ui(x′i)), if ui(xi) 6= ui(x′i).
The function ui is upper semicontinuous if and only if Lα is closed for each α.
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Now, we come to our first result. This result has been proved by adding a
virtual commodity to the economy and then modifying the utility functions
of the agents. Our proof follows the steps of Le Van and Minh (2004) in
introducing a new commodity, but our modification of the utility functions
differs from theirs. The advantage of such a modification will become clear
when we introduce a new nonsatiation assumption. Let us recall the following
definition.
Definition 3. Let B be a closed convex nonempty set of Rl, where l is an
integer. The recession cone of B, denoted by O+B, is defined as follows:
O+B = {w ∈ Rl : ∀x ∈ B, ∀λ ≥ 0, x+ λw ∈ B.}
We first give an intermediate result. The proof of the result is new, since
we use a new modification of utility functions. The modified economy is
then used to establish the existence of a quasi-equilibrium with dividends for
the initial economy. In the following, we restrict the economy to compact
consumption sets.
Proposition 1. Assume (H1)− (H2), and for every i ∈ I, the consumption
set Xi is compact. Then there exists a quasi-equilibrium with dividends.
Proof. Let us introduce the auxiliary economy Ê =
{
(X̂i, ûi, êi)i∈I
}
, where
X̂i = Xi×R+, êi = (ei, δi) with δi > 0 for any i ∈ I and the utility functions
ûi are defined as follows. Let Mi = max {ui(xi) | xi ∈ Ai} .
Case 1. If there exists x∗i ∈ Aci (the complement of Ai in Xi), such that
ui(x
∗
i ) > Mi, then ûi(xi, di) = ui(xi) for every (xi, di) ∈ X̂i.
Case 2. Now, consider the case where there exists no xi ∈ Aci which satisfies
ui(xi) > Mi, but there exists x
∗
i ∈ Aci , such that ui(x∗i ) = Mi. We modify
agent’s i utility function as follows:
Using x∗i we define the function
λi(·) : Si → R+ ∪ {+∞} ,
where,
λi(xi) = sup{β ∈ R+ | x∗i + β(xi − x∗i ) ∈ Si}.
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Now, using the function λi, we can define a new utility function, ûi, for agent
i:
ûi(xi, di) =
{
ui(xi) + 1− 1λi(xi) , if xi ∈ Si
ui(xi), otherwise,
for every (xi, di) ∈ X̂i.
Case 3. If there exists no xi ∈ Aci , such that ui(xi) ≥ Mi, then, for some
strictly positive µi let
ûi(xi, di) =
{
ui(xi) + µidi, if xi ∈ Si
ui(xi), otherwise,
for every (xi, di) ∈ X̂i.
We will check that Assumption (H2) is satisfied for every ûi.We will make
use of the following lemma, the proof of which is in the Appendix.
Lemma 1. Let B be a compact, convex set of Rl and x∗ be in B. Let
λ : B → R+ ∪ {+∞} be defined by
λ(x) = sup{β ≥ 0 : x∗ + β(x− x∗) ∈ B}.
Then λ is upper semicontinuous and strictly quasi-concave.
To prove that ûi is quasi-concave and upper semicontinuous, it suffices to
prove that the set L̂αi = {(xi, di) ∈ Xi ×R+ : ûi(xi, di) ≥ α} is closed and
convex for every α.
Case 1. It is clear that L̂αi = L
α
i × R+, with Lαi = {xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi) ≥ α}.
Therefore, L̂αi is closed and convex for every α.
Case 2. (a) If α ≤Mi, then obviously L̂αi = Lαi ×R+.
(b) If Mi < α ≤ 1 +Mi, then one can easily prove that L̂αi = σi( 1(Mi+1−α))×
R+, where σ
i( 1
(Mi+1−α)) = {x ∈ Si : λi(x) ≥ 1(Mi+1−α)}. From Lemma 1, this
set is closed and convex.
(c) If 1 +Mi < α, then obviously L̂
α
i = ∅.
Case 3. We follow here the proof given by Le Van and Minh (2004), in which
we have two cases,
(a) If α < Mi. We claim that L̂
α
i = L
α
i × R+. Indeed, let (xi, di) ∈ L̂αi . It
follows that ûi(xi, di) ≥ α, and there are two possibilities for xi:
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• If xi /∈ Si, then ûi(xi, di) = ui(xi). It implies that ui(xi) ≥ α or xi ∈ Lαi ,
and hence (xi, di) ∈ Lαi ×R+.
• If xi ∈ Si, then ui(xi) = Mi > α. Thus, it follows that xi ∈ Lαi and
(xi, di) ∈ Lαi ×R+.
So, L̂αi ⊂ Lαi ×R+. But it is obvious that Lαi ×R+ ⊂ L̂αi .
(b) If α ≥ Mi. We claim that L̂αi = Si ×
{
di | di ≥ α−Miµ
}
. Indeed, if
ûi(xi, di) ≥ α, then xi ∈ Si. In this case, ûi(xi, di) = Mi + µdi ≥ α, and
hence di ≥ α−Miµ . The converse is obvious. We have proved that ûi is upper
semicontinuous and quasi-concave, for every i ∈ I.
Now, we prove that ûi is strictly quasi-concave.
Claim 1. The utility function ûi is strictly quasi-concave, for every i ∈ I.
Proof. See the Appendix .¤
Obviously, the set of individually rational feasible allocations of economy Ê
is compact since Xi is compact for every i ∈ I. Assumption (H3) is fulfilled
by economy Ê .
We now prove that the utility function ûi has no satiation point on the set
Âi, the projection of Â onto X̂i.
Case 1. It is obvious.
Case 2. Since λi(x
∗
i ) = +∞, it suffices to prove that λi(xi) < +∞, for any
xi ∈ Ai. For that, take xi ∈ Si ∩ Ai. If λi(xi) = +∞, then for all β ≥ 0,
x∗i+β(xi−x∗i ) ∈ Si. Since O+Si = {0}, one obtains xi = x∗i which contradicts
x∗i ∈ Aci .
Case 3. Indeed, let (xi, di) ∈ Xi × R+. Take any x′i ∈ Si and d′i > di. We
have
ûi(x
′
i, d
′
i) = ui(x
′
i) + µd
′
i > ui(xi) + µdi ≥ ûi(xi, di).
We have proved that for any i ∈ I, ûi has no satiation point.
Summing up, Assumptions (H1) − (H4) are fulfilled in the economy Ê .
From Theorem 1, there exists a Walras quasi-equilibrium ((x∗i , d
∗
i )i∈I , (p
∗, q∗))
with (p∗, q∗) 6= (0, 0). It satisfies:
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(i)
∑
i∈I
(x∗i , d
∗
i ) =
∑
i∈I
(ei, δi),
(ii) for any i ∈ I, p∗ · x∗i + q∗d∗i = p∗ · ei + q∗δi.
Observe that the price q∗ must be nonnegative.
We claim that ((x∗i )i∈I , p
∗) is a quasi-equilibrium with dividends (q∗δi)i∈I .
Indeed, first, we have
∀i ∈ I, p∗ · x∗i ≤ p∗ · ei + q∗δi.
Now, let xi ∈ Xi such that ui(xi) > ui(x∗i ). That implies x∗i /∈ Si, and hence
ûi(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ) = ui(x
∗
i ).
We have ûi(xi, 0) = ui(xi) and hence ûi(xi, 0) > ûi(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ). Applying the
previous theorem, we obtain
p∗xi = p∗ · xi + q∗ × 0 ≥ p∗ · ei + q∗δi.
We have proved our proposition.¤
Now, we show that Proposition 1 still holds by dropping the assumption
that every consumption set is compact and replacing it by the compactness
of the utility set U . Our method of proving existence is new and will be
useful for the proof of the main result.
Theorem 2. Assume (H1) − (H3). Then there exists a quasi-equilibrium
with dividends.
Proof. Let (δi > 0)i∈I . Let B¯(0, n) denote the closed ball centered at the
origin with radius n, where n is an integer. Choose N sufficiently large such
that for all n > N we have ei ∈ B¯(0, n), for all i ∈ I. Consider the sequence of
economies {En} defined by En = (Xni , ui, ei)i∈I where Xni = Xi∩B¯(0, n). Any
economy En satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 1. Let ûni : Xni ×R+ → R
be the modified utility associated with En as in the proof of Proposition
1. The utility functions {(ûni )i∈I} have no satiation points and are strictly
quasi-concave. Hence, from Proposition 1 there exists a quasi-equilibrium
((x∗ni )i∈I , p
∗n) with dividends (q∗nδi)i∈I , and ‖(p∗n, q∗n)‖ = 1. We have for
each n, there exist (d∗ni )i ∈ I such that :
(a)
∑
i∈I(x
∗n
i , d
∗n
i ) =
∑
i∈I(ei, δi),
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(b) p∗n · x∗ni + q∗nd∗ni = p∗n · ei + q∗nδi,
(c) if xi ∈ Xni satisfies ui(xi) > ui(x∗ni ), then we have p∗n ·xi ≥ p∗n ·ei+q∗nδi.
Now, let n go to +∞. Since U is compact, the sequence {(ui(x∗ni )i∈I)}
converges to (v∗i )i∈I ∈ U . There exist (x∗i )i∈I ∈ A which satisfy v∗i ≤ ui(x∗i ),
for all i ∈ I. We can also assume that (p∗n, q∗n) converge to (p∗, q∗) 6= (0, 0)
and (d∗ni )i∈I converges to (d
∗
i )i∈I .
We claim that ((x∗i )i∈I , p
∗) is, for the initial economy E , a quasi-equilibrium
with dividends (q∗δi)i∈I . Indeed, we have
(a)
∑
i∈I(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ) =
∑
i∈I(ei, δi).
Let us prove that we have p∗ · x∗i + q∗d∗i = p∗ · ei + q∗δi. There exists N
such that for all n > N, x∗i ∈ Xni , for all i ∈ I. In the following we take
n > N . Let (xi, di) ∈ Xni × R+ which satisfies ûni (xi, di) > ûni (x∗i , d∗i ). Let
θ ∈]0, 1[. We have ûni (θxi + (1 − θ)x∗i , θdi + (1 − θ)d∗i ) > ûni (x∗i , d∗i ). Thus,
p∗n · (θxi+(1−θ)x∗i )+q∗n(θdi+(1−θ)d∗i ) ≥ p∗n ·ei+q∗nδi. Let θ converge to
0. We get for all i ∈ I, p∗n ·x∗i + q∗nd∗i ≥ p∗n · ei+ q∗nδi. Since
∑
i∈I(x
∗
i , d
∗
i ) =∑
i∈I(ei, δi), we have for all i ∈ I, p∗n · x∗i + q∗nd∗i = p∗n · e∗i + q∗nδi. Letting
n go to +∞, we obtain p∗ · x∗i + q∗d∗i = p∗ · ei + q∗δi.
Now, let ui(xi) > ui(x
∗
i ). For n large enough, xi ∈ Xni . Since ui(x∗ni )
converges to v∗i ≤ ui(x∗i ), for any n sufficiently large, we have ui(xi) >
ui(x
∗n
i ) and hence p
∗n · xi ≥ p∗n · ei + q∗nδi. When n goes to +∞ we obtain
p∗ · xi ≥ p∗ · ei + q∗δi. We have proved that ((x∗i )i∈I , p∗) is, for the initial
economy E , a quasi-equilibrium with dividends (q∗δi)i∈I .¤
3.2 New nonsatiation assumption
The above concept of equilibrium with dividends is used in the literature
whenever the standard nonsatiation assumption fails to be satisfied, that is to
say, the satiation area overlaps with the individually feasible consumption set.
The underlying idea is to allow the nonsatiated consumers to benefit, through
dividends, from the budget surplus created by non budget-binding optimal
consumptions of satiated consumers. A shortcoming of equilibrium with
dividends is that, granting additional incomes to consumers could possibly
be inconsistent with the spirit of decentralized markets.
In the following we introduce our new nonsatiation assumption. First,
observe that under (H1) − (H3), for every i ∈ I, there exists x̂i ∈ Ai which
satisfies ui(x̂i) =Mi = max{ui(xi) | xi ∈ Ai}.
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Using Mi, Assumption (H4) could be rewritten in another way.
(H4) For every i, there exists x
′
i ∈ Aci such that ui(x′i) > Mi.
We introduce a new nonsatiation condition (H ′4) weaker than (H4).
(H ′4) For every i, there exists x
′
i ∈ Aci such that ui(x′i) ≥Mi.
Assumption (H ′4) allows to have satiation points inside the individually fea-
sible consumptions set, provided that the satiation area is not a subset of
the individually feasible consumption set.
We now state the main contribution of this paper. We demonstrate that
using our new nonsatiation assumption (H ′4) leads us to the existence of
a Walras quasi-equilibrium. Hence, we show that the concept of (quasi-
)equilibrium with dividends is relevant only when the satiation area is a
subset of individually feasible consumption set.
Theorem 3. Assume (H1) − (H3) and (H ′4). Then there exists a Walras
quasi-equilibrium.
Proof. Consider again the sequence of economies {En} in the proof of The-
orem 2. For any i ∈ I, from (H ′4), one can take some x′i ∈ Aci such that
ui(x
′
i) ≥ Mi. Choose n large enough such that for all n > N, x′i ∈ Xni ,
for all i ∈ I. From the proof of Theorem 1, there exists a quasi-equilibrium
((x∗ni )i∈I , p
∗n) with dividends (q∗nδi)i∈I , and ‖(p∗n, q∗n)‖ = 1. For each n,
there exist (d∗ni )i∈I such that:
(a)
∑
i∈I(x
∗n
i , d
∗n
i ) =
∑
i∈I(ei, δi),
(b) p∗n · x∗ni + q∗nd∗ni = p∗n · ei + q∗nδi,
(c) and if xi ∈ Xni satisfies ui(xi) > ui(x∗ni ) then we have p∗n · xi ≥ p∗n · ei +
q∗nδi.
Now, we show that q∗nd∗ni = 0. It is clear that from (H
′
4) we have just to
consider only cases 1 and 2.
Thus, let ûni (xi, 0) > û
n
i (x
∗n
i , d
∗n
i ) = û
n
i (x
∗n
i , 0). We then have,
p∗n · xi ≥ p∗n · ei + q∗nδi = p∗n · x∗ni + q∗nd∗i .
For any λ ∈ ]0, 1[ , from the strict quasi-concavity of ûni , we have ûni (λxi +
(1− λ)x∗ni ) > ûni (x∗ni ) and hence p∗n · (λxi + (1− λ)x∗ni ) ≥ p∗n · x∗ni + q∗nd∗ni .
Letting λ converge to zero, we obtain q∗nd∗ni ≤ 0. Thus, q∗nd∗ni = 0. Since∑
i∈I d
∗n
i =
∑
i∈I δi > 0, it follows that q
∗n = 0. In this case, one deduces
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‖p∗n‖ = 1 and therefore ((x∗ni )i∈I , p∗n) is a Walras quasi-equilibrium for En.
Finally, let n go to +∞. Since U is compact, the sequence {(ui(x∗ni ))i∈I}
converges to (vi)i∈I and there exist (x∗i )i∈I ∈ A which satisfy vi ≤ ui(x∗i ), for
all i ∈ I. We also have p∗n converges to p∗ 6= 0. We claim that ((x∗i )i∈I , p∗)
is a Walras quasi-equilibrium. Indeed, we have
∑
i∈I x
∗
i =
∑
i∈I ei. Now,
let ui(xi) > ui(x
∗
i ). For n large enough, xi ∈ Xni . Since ui(x∗ni ) converges
to vi ≤ ui(x∗i ), for any n sufficiently large, we have ui(xi) > ui(x∗ni ) and
hence p∗n · xi ≥ p∗n · ei. When n goes to +∞, we obtain p∗ · xi ≥ p∗ · ei.
We have proved that ((x∗i )i∈I , p
∗) is, for the initial economy E , a Walras
quasi-equilibrium.¤
4 Securities market
In securities markets with short-selling, Werner (1987) introduces a nonsa-
tiation condition which requires each trader to have a useful portfolio. Ac-
cordingly, Werner (1987) proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium
in securities markets.
For each agent i ∈ I, we define the weakly preferred set at xi ∈ Xi
P̂i(xi) = {x ∈ Xi | ui(x) ≥ ui(xi)}. Under assumptions (H1) − (H2), the
weak preferred set P̂i(xi) is convex and closed for every xi ∈ Xi. We define
the ith agent’s arbitrage cone at xi ∈ Xi as O+P̂i(xi), the recession cone of
the weakly preferred set P̂i(xi). Also, we define the lineality set Li(xi) as the
largest subspace contained in the arbitrage cone O+P̂i(xi).
For notational simplicity, we denote each agent’s arbitrage cone and lin-
eality space at endowments in a special way. In particular, we will let,
Ri := O
+P̂i(ei), and Li := L(ei).
Werner (1987) assumes the two following assumptions:
[W1] (Uniformity) O+P̂i(xi) = Ri, for all, xi ∈ Xi, for each i ∈ I.
[W2] (Werner’s nonsatiation) Ri \ Li 6= ∅, for each i ∈ I.
The first assumption asserts that every agent has uniform arbitrage cones.
The second assumption is viewed as a nonsatiation assumption. It requires
that there exists a useful net trade vector ri ∈ Ri \ Li. This is a portfolio
which, when added, at any rate, to any given portfolio increases the trader’s
utility.
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Werner (1987) also introduces a no-arbitrage condition [WNAC], which stipu-
lates that there exists a price system at which the value of all useful portfolios
is positive.
[WNAC] The economy E satisfies ⋂Ii=1 SWi 6= ∅, where SWi = {p ∈ R` |
p · y > 0, ∀y ∈ Ri \ Li} is Werner’s cone of no-arbitrage prices.
It follows from Allouch, Le Van and Page (2002) that [WNAC] implies that
U is compact. Hence, Assumption (H3) is satisfied.
In the following proposition we show that Werner’s nonsatiation implies
assumption (H ′4).
Proposition 2. Assume (H1)−(H2), [W1] and [WNAC]. Then, [W2] implies
(H ′4).
Proof. Let i0 ∈ I. Since [WNAC] implies that U is compact, there exists
x∗i0 = argmaxAi0ui0(.). Let vi0 ∈ Ri0 \ Li0 and let {(λn)} be a sequence of
real numbers such λn ≥ 0, for all n and λn goes to +∞. Since vi0 is a useful
direction, it follows that ui0(x
∗
i0
+λnvi0) ≥ ui0(x∗i0) =Mi0 , for all n.We claim
that, that there exists n0, such that (x
∗
i0
+ λn0vi0) /∈ Ai0 . Suppose not, then
there exists {(xni )} a sequence in A such that xni0 = x∗i0 + λnvi0 , for all n.
Since
∑I
i=1 ‖xni ‖ goes to +∞, without loss of generality, we can assume that
for all i ∈ I,
xni∑I
i=1 ‖xni ‖
→ vi,
such that for all i ∈ I \{i0}, vi ∈ Ri and vi0+
∑
i∈I\{i0} vi = 0. From [WNAC]
there exists p ∈ ⋂Ii=1 SWi , then it follows that
p · (vi0 +
∑
i∈I\{i0}
vi) = p · 0 > 0,
which is a contradiction. Thus, (H ′4) holds.¤
Corollary 1. Assume (H1) − (H2), [W1]-[W2] and [WNAC]. Then, there
exists a Walras quasi-equilibrium.
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4.1 Example
Now, we provide an example where both the standard nonsatiation assump-
tion (H4) and Werner’s nonsatiation [W2] fail to be satisfied. However, our
new nonsatiation assumption (H ′4) holds. In this example, we have the ex-
istence of a competitive equilibrium that could not have been inferred from
standard existence theorems.
Example Consider the economy with two consumers and two commodities.
Consumer 1 has the following characteristics:
X1 = [0, 10]× [0, 10],
u1(x1, y1) =
{
min{x1, y1}, if either x1 ∈ [0, 3] or y1 ∈ [0, 3],
3 otherwise.
e1 = (6, 2).
Consumer 2 has the following characteristics:
X2 = R
2
+,
u2(x2, y2) = x2 + y2,
e2 = (2, 6).
We have u1(e1) = 2, u2(e2) = 8.
The satiation set of agent 1 is S1 = [3, 10] × [3, 10]. Let ζ1 = (x1, y1), ζ2 =
(x2, y2). The set of individually rational feasible allocations is:
A = {(ζ1, ζ2) ∈ X1 ×X2 : ζ1 + ζ2 = (8, 8), and u1(ζ1) ≥ 2, u2(ζ2) ≥ 8}.
It is easy to see that (3, 3) ∈ A1 and u1(3, 3) = 3 = M1. Hence, for agent
1, Assumption (H4) is not satisfied. It is also worth noticing that Werner’s
nonsatiation is not satisfied by agent 1, since X1 is a compact set, and there-
fore R1 = {0}. However, it is obvious that Assumption (H ′4) is satisfied by
both consumers, since (10, 10) /∈ A1 and u1(10, 10) = 3 = M1, for agent 1
and (H4) is satisfied for agent 2.
One can easily show that the allocation ((4, 4), (4, 4)) together with the price
(1, 1) is an equilibrium for the economy.
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5 Appendix
Lemma 1 Let B be a compact, convex set of Rl and x∗ be in B. Let λ :
B → R+ ∪ {+∞} be defined by
λ(x) = sup{β ≥ 0 : x∗ + β(x− x∗) ∈ B}.
Then λ is upper semicontinuous and strictly quasi-concave.
Proof. First, observe that λ(x) ≥ 1,∀x ∈ B.
(i) Upper semicontinuity of λ: First we have:
λ(x) = +∞⇔ x = x∗.
Let xn converge to x. If lim supλ(xn) = +∞, take a subsequence which
satisfies limλ(xν) = +∞. Let ε > 0 be any small positive number. We have
x∗ + (λ(xν)− ε)(xν − x∗) = zν ∈ B, ∀ν,
or
(xν − x∗) = z
ν − x∗
λ(xν)− ε.
Let ν go to +∞. We have zν−x∗
λ(xν)−ε goes to 0, hence, x
ν converges to x∗ and
x = x∗. That implies λ(x) = +∞ and lim supλ(xn) = λ(x).
Now, assume lim supλ(xn) = A < +∞. Without loss of generality, one can
assume that λ(xn) converges to A. Take any ε > 0 small enough. Then,
∀n, x∗+(λ(xn)−ε)(xn−x∗) ∈ B. Let n go to infinity. Then x∗+(A−ε)(x−
x∗) ∈ B. That implies λ(x) ≥ A − ε for any ε > 0 small enough. In other
words, λ(x) ≥ lim supλ(xn). We have proved that λ is upper semicontinuous.
(ii) Quasi-concavity of λ: Let x1 ∈ B, x2 ∈ B, θ ∈ [0, 1] and x = θx1+ (1−
θ)x2.
Assume λ(x1) ≤ λ(x2). As before take any ε > 0 small enough. We then
have
x∗ + (λ(x1)− ε)(x1 − x∗) ∈ B,
and
x∗ + (λ(x1)− ε)(x2 − x∗) ∈ B,
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since λ(x1) ≤ λ(x2). Thus
θ(x∗ + (λ(x1)− ε)(x1 − x∗)) + (1− θ)(x∗ + (λ(x1)− ε)(x2 − x∗)) ∈ B
since B is convex. We obtain x∗+(λ(x1)−ε)(θx1+(1−θ)x2−x∗) ∈ B. Hence
λ(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≥ λ(x1)− ε for any ε > 0 small enough. In other words,
λ(θx1+(1− θ)x2) ≥ min{λ(x1), λ(x2)}. We have proved the quasi-concavity
of λ.
(iii) Strict quasi-concavity of λ: Let λ(x2) > λ(x1). We first claim that
x∗ + λ(x1)(x1 − x∗) ∈ B. Indeed, ∀n, x∗ + (λ(x1) − 1n)(x1 − x∗) ∈ B. Let n
go to +∞. The closedness of B implies that x∗ + λ(x1)(x1 − x∗) ∈ B.
Now, let θ ∈]0, 1[. We claim that λ(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) > λ(x1). For notational
simplicity, we write λ1 = λ(x1), λ2 = λ(x2). Let A satisfy λ1 < A < λ2.
Then x∗ + A(x2 − x∗) ∈ B. Hence
θA
λ1(1− θ) + θA(x
∗ + λ1(x1 − x∗)) + λ1(1− θ)
λ1(1− θ) + θA(x
∗ + A(x2 − x∗)) ∈ B,
or equivalently
x∗ +
Aλ1
λ1(1− θ) + θA(θx1 + (1− θ)x2 − x
∗) ∈ B.
Thus, λ(θx1 + (1− θ)x2) ≥ Aλ1λ1(1−θ)+θA > λ1, since A > λ1.¤
Claim 1 The utility function ûi is strictly quasi-concave.
Proof. Let
ûi(x2, d2) > ûi(x1, d1) (1)
and θ ∈]0, 1[. We claim that
ûi(θ(x2, d2) + (1− θ)(x1, d1)) > ûi(x1, d1). (2)
Let us distinguish the three cases again:
Case 1. The claim is obviously true since (1) is equivalent to ui(x2) > ui(x1)
and ui is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave.
Case 2. We have two sub-cases.
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(a) If x1 ∈ Si, then x2 ∈ Si. In this case, (1) is equivalent to λi(x2) > λi(x1).
From Lemma 1, λi is strictly quasi-concave. Hence (2) is true, since Si is
convex, and therefore θx2 + (1− θ)x1 ∈ Si.
(b) If x1 /∈ Si. Then (1) is equivalent to ui(x2) > ui(x1).
Since ui is a strictly quasi-concave function, we obtain
ui((1− θ)x1 + θx2) > ui(x1).
Therefore, one has
ûi(θ(x2, d2) + (1− θ)(x1, d1)) ≥ ui(θx2 + (1− θ)x1) > ui(x1) = ûi(x1, d1),
and consequently (2) is true.
Case 3. We can consider the following cases:
(a)If x1 ∈ Si, then x2 ∈ Si. Hence, we have
ûi(x1, d1) =Mi + µd1, ûi(x2, d2) =Mi + µd2.
It follows from (1) that d2 > d1. Hence,
(1− θ)d1 + θd2 > (1− θ)d1 + θd1 = d1.
Since (1− θ)x1 + θx2 ∈ Si, we deduce
ûi((1− θ)x1 + θx2, (1− θ)d1 + θd2) =
Mi + µ((1− θ)d1 + θd2) > Mi + µd1 = ûi(x1, d1).
(b)If x1 /∈ Si. Then (1) implies ui(x2) > ui(x1). Since ui is a strictly quasi-
concave function, we obtain
ui((1− θ)x1 + θx2) > ui(x1).
Then, it follows that
ûi((1−θ)x1+θx2, (1−θ)d1+θd2) ≥ ui((1−θ)x1+θx2) > ui(x1) = ûi(x1, d1).
The proof of the claim is complete.¤
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